

The British Reaction towards Ostpolitik. Anglo-West German Relations in the Era of Détente 1967-1971

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In the late 1960s a new term was added to the list of the few German expressions well known internationally and particularly in the English speaking world. *Ostpolitik* stood for the new attitude and policy of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the Warsaw Pact states. Great Britain underwent a period of adaptation to international realities too. It applied for membership of the European Communities. Both the Federal Republic and Great Britain were newcomers: the Germans in Eastern and the British in Western Europe. Both could support each other in their respective fields. Hence Anglo-German relations entered a new period shaped by common views and interests. The Federal Republic, contrary to de Gaulle's France, welcomed the British turn towards Europe. Great Britain regarded the West German acceptance of the existing borders in Europe as overdue.

This is the background which one has to take into account before dealing more specifically with the British assessment of the Federal Republic's role in East-West relations and of the implications of *Ostpolitik*. Furthermore, one should have in mind that British policy makers and experts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)¹ as well as people in the media perceived *Ostpolitik* not only as a new start in the relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe but also as an indicator of a new self-confidence of the West German foreign policy establishment and of a more active role of the Federal Republic in international affairs. Finally, the new position of the Federal Republic as a rising power in Europe and the reorientation of Britain as a power in retreat from world power status has to be seen in the context of a general change in the international outlook. New elements were added to the bipolar structure of post-war politics. East-West relations changed from Cold War to détente.

As to the theme of this volume my paper should be seen as a contribution to Anglo-German relations in the era of détente rather than a contribution to the interrelation between political elites and public opinion. Certainly *Ostpolitik* and its perception in Britain were of public interest but there was no proper debate on how Britain should react towards it. Politicians, government officials and journalists raised the same questions with respect to the meaning of *Ostpolitik*, the Soviet Union's aims in Europe and the chances for détente. *Ostpolitik* was of greater importance for the German than for the British public. The Federal Republic attracted more attention in the context of Britain's efforts to join

Europe.² Europe was a matter of public debate and to a certain extent a controversial one. In contrast to the discourse on Europe the debate on *Ostpolitik* was almost without any controversies and eventually it was backed by „the entire British establishment“.³ Certain aspects of *Ostpolitik*, such as the recognition of the post-war borders in Europe, were accepted without any reservations. The reaction towards other aspects, for instance the possible consequences of the German-Soviet rapprochement, was more cautious. An interesting question is whether the Conservative Government taking office in June 1970 differed from the preceding Labour Government. Undoubtedly, the Conservatives seemed to be more anxious about the risks of *Ostpolitik* than Labour.⁴

I. The meaning and phases of *Ostpolitik*

Contrary to the 1950s the majority of the West Germans in the 1960s began to realize that the non-recognition of the post-war order in Europe had come to an end. The Berlin crisis launched by the Soviet Union in 1958 demonstrated the breakdown of earlier concepts for handling the German question, just as the events in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956 had done so with respect to the Western roll-back strategy. After the Berlin crisis the Western Powers still acknowledged the West German wish for self-determination but they regarded it as an abstract principle rather than an attainable goal. The relaxation of tensions with the East was of greater urgency than the restoration of the German nation state. To put it more precisely: The abandonment of the reunification of Germany seemed to be an indispensable contribution to détente in Europe. Consequently, the Federal Republic had to reformulate its policy in order to avoid its isolation within the Western world.

The general concept of *Ostpolitik* as a more flexible response to post-war realities had already been developed both by Willy Brandt during his term as Governing Mayor of West Berlin since 1957⁵ and by Chancellor Adenauer in 1958 when he proposed a deal with the Soviet Union, after he had opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955. Adenauer's successor Ludwig Erhard and his Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schröder, started to conclude trade agreements with Eastern European countries in 1963.⁶ In March 1966 the Federal Republic published a „Peace Note“, which suggested the renunciation of the use of force as a guiding principle in international relations. It was distributed world wide with the exception of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) which was not recognized as a separate state and therefore could not receive any West German diplomatic correspondence. For Frank Roberts, British Ambassador in Bonn between 1963 and 1968, the „Peace Note“ was „a turning point in post-war foreign policy of the Federal Republic. For the first time peace and reconciliation in the East and not only in the West became

positive and so to speak active weapons of German diplomacy.⁷ The note represented a „landmark departure“, yet it said „little new“ with regard to the German question (which also involved the borders of 1937).⁸

Only in the late 1960s did the Federal Republic move forward. The hitherto loose concept of *Ostpolitik* had to be transformed into political action which had to start from a new attitude towards the possibility of re-unification. Bonn's most important ally pointed the way. In October 1966 President Lyndon B. Johnson made perfectly clear that Washington was no longer willing to await the resolution of the German question as a precondition for progress in East-West relations.⁹ After Erhard's resignation the Grand Coalition Government formed by the two biggest political parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD), in November 1966 had consequently to develop a new approach.

The new government with Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) as Federal Chancellor and Willy Brandt (SPD) as Foreign Minister marked a departure in *Ostpolitik*. Brandt left his post in Berlin and was accompanied by his close aide Egon Bahr, who had been the press secretary of the West Berlin Senate and the author of the famous formula *Wandel durch Annäherung* (change through rapprochement). In Bonn Bahr became the head of the planning staff in the Foreign Ministry (*Auswärtiges Amt*). Without losing much time the Grand Coalition Government tried to establish a new view, namely that détente in Europe was a precondition for improvements in Germany and not vice versa. The Federal Republic aimed at normalizing its relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the renunciation of force and at establishing full diplomatic relations with the Warsaw Pact states thereby eroding the Hallstein doctrine. FCO officials were not completely wrong when they observed that „the new policy towards Eastern Europe“ was „no more than the logical extension of the more pragmatic and positive approach already adumbrated by Dr. Schröder when Minister of Foreign Affairs under Dr. Erhard.“¹⁰ At the same time they did not fail to acknowledge that it was an „extension“.

At that stage the *Ostpolitik* suffered from a crucial shortcoming as it excluded the GDR. For the East this was unacceptable. Some kind of recognition of the GDR seemed inevitable. After the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 which was a brutal shock for any illusions about the possibility of an early change through rapprochement Bahr's planning staff proposed the acceptance of „some elements of the status quo“ in order to make further progress in East-West relations. This might include the recognition of the GDR as a state, although, given the West German mainstream attitude towards the ‚Ulbricht regime‘, any kind of recognition of the second German state was a bold step.¹¹ It was only taken after the general election of September 1969 when a new government was formed by the SPD and the Liberal Party, the Free

Democrats (FDP), with Brandt as Chancellor and Walter Scheel as Foreign Minister.

A more realistic view of the post-war realities in Germany and Eastern Europe and the will to promote better relations with the Soviet Union was the main link between SPD and FDP. At that time *Ostpolitik* entered its second phase with the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw in August and December 1970 as highlights. *Ostpolitik* at that stage was a bilateral affair between Bonn on the one side and Moscow respectively Warsaw on the other. It had still to be endorsed by the Western Powers for it was their business to deal with Berlin. The German-Soviet negotiations in 1970 and the further contacts involving Brandt's meeting with Brezhnev in September 1971 as a demonstration of the new normalcy in German-Soviet relations were part of the general though not always strictly coordinated Western policy of détente.

The final stage of the *Ostpolitik's* second phase was reached when both German states agreed on a treaty regulating the relations between them. Now the third phase could start with the implementation of the bilateral treaties. These also formed part of a multilateral policy of détente in Europe which was launched by the Helsinki process. In April 1974 Brandt told Harold Wilson that he was pleased with the state of affairs in the Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states. The „bilateral phase“ of *Ostpolitik* was to be continued as far as the GDR was concerned. In general, however, the „multilateral phase“ in the policy towards Eastern Europe could start.¹²

When dealing with British reactions towards the *Ostpolitik* one has to have in mind that the different phases just sketched out provoked different reactions. Broadly speaking, Great Britain supported the new West German approach towards Eastern Europe throughout. The first phase of *Ostpolitik* was the step towards the recognition of realities in Europe, long awaited by the British foreign policy making elite. During its third phase *Ostpolitik* was embedded in the multilateral negotiations between East and West on security and the reduction of forces in Europe. Only the second phase gave rise to some scepticism and a certain degree of uneasiness. It aroused the question which had dominated British perceptions of Germany since the turn of the century¹³: What were the Germans up to? How would they use their influence and power?

II. Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany in a period of transition

International history in the late 1960s and early 1970s was shaped by an enormous amount of change world wide. It was a period of transition in many

respects, as the protest movements of the „1968ers“ in many countries, the breakdown of the post-war bipolar system and the emergence of a new multipolar structure with the superpowers still unrivalled in military power but with the inclusion of China, Japan and Europe as new centres of power, the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the Israeli-Arab conflict with the oil price shock of 1973 as its aftermath all indicate.¹⁴ As to East-West relations both the United States of America and the Soviet Union were interested in a relaxation of tension. This was due to the inability of both sides to reach a status of clear superiority. Furthermore, the events in Vietnam with the Tet offensive in January 1968 and in Eastern Europe with the questioning of Moscow's regime by Roumania and Czechoslovakia marked the limits of American and Soviet power and the dangers of imperial overstretch. Hence, confrontation was to be substituted by cooperation. This at least was the message of President Nixon in 1969 to which Brezhnev responded when he sought détente in the Soviet Union's relations with the West after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Both Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany were deeply involved in most features of this process of change. British perceptions of West Germany's role in East-West relations have to be seen in this context. Britain shared the German interest in détente although for different reasons. For Britain détente was helpful when she had to come to terms with her new status as a European power. For the Federal Republic détente was the essential precondition if she not only wanted to accept the post-war order but also wished to play a leading role in European and transatlantic affairs. When the Cold War commenced in 1946/47 Britain was one of its main actors and the Federal Republic did not even exist. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Federal Republic, being a product of the Cold War, strove to overcome the Cold War confrontation in Europe and to establish for herself a respectable position internationally. For Britain, as well as for the Federal Republic the immediate post-war period came to a close. Consequently bilateral Anglo-German relations and mutual perceptions entered a new phase.¹⁵

Although the decision to withdraw from East of Suez by the end of 1971 was announced in 1968 Great Britain still pursued interests on a global scale. Being the centre of the Commonwealth and having obligations in the Middle East, in Africa and Asia the British foreign policy agenda differed fundamentally from the West German agenda.¹⁶ At the same time Great Britain and the Federal Republic became more similar. In a summary of British foreign policy issues produced for the incoming Conservative Government in June 1970 the FCO described Britain „as a power roughly of the economic order of France or Federal Germany“ and „as a nation living by trade with the rest of the world“. The FCO did not stress Britain's military capacity and regarded the two superpowers as remaining „in a class apart“. Primarily, Britain was a trading state and

thereby belonged to the same category as the Federal Republic. Through her „mercantile and Commonwealth connections“ Britain had „important world-wide interests and influence“. But she was „likely to play primarily a European and Atlantic role“. A departure in foreign policy thinking was necessary: „We have been in retreat since the war and the time for consolidation has now [...] come.“¹⁷

In a way the British situation was comparable to that of the Federal Republic. Both countries had to accommodate themselves to international realities. Great Britain had still a special weight in world politics, but she was not a world power any more: „Europe, therefore, lies at the centre of our policies.“¹⁸ The Federal Republic still argued that the German question was unresolved and that a final settlement in Europe depended on a peace treaty. But in practice the division of Germany and the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe were regarded as a reality for the foreseeable future. The Federal Republic ceased to be a provisional state and had developed her own identity, especially as far as the younger generation was concerned.

The success story of the Federal Republic in the 1950s and 1960s and its re-entry into international affairs was inextricably linked with the process of Western European integration. West German foreign policy was strictly embedded in a European framework. Rather than being a traditional nation state the Federal Republic was an experienced pioneer of European integration, not without provoking searching questions about her policy „in Europe’s name“.¹⁹ When the Labour Government decided to apply for membership of the E.E.C. British hopes to silence de Gaulle’s doubts rested firmly on the expectation that the Federal Republic would support Great Britain and could break French resistance.

The failure of Britain’s application in 1967, due to the French veto, did not alter the British perception that the Federal Republic was in a key-position, not least because of the steady decline of the traditionally dominant position of France in Western Europe. In May 1969 it was assumed that „German influence in Western Europe will increase“.²⁰ The Whitehall view concurred with the assessment of the British embassy in Bonn. Ambassador Jackling, who had become Roberts’ successor in 1968, observed a „new trend“ in West German policy: „Among its features are a greater self-reliance, a feeling that the period of atonement for the war is over, impatience with restraints on German liberty of action [...].“²¹ The change of West German policy if not in substance but in style („a new consciousness of national interest and power“) can be seen in the wider context of change mentioned above. Jackling’s impression was shared at the FCO. The Federal Republic was „moving slowly out of the era of tutelage and beginning to wonder whether and how she can use in world affairs the strength which her economic development has given her.“²²

Taking into account the enhanced position of the Federal Republic in Europe²³ the British „should concentrate on improving their relations with Germany“. This at least was the advice given by Jean Monnet to Prime Minister Wilson in January 1969. The latter replied that his Government „had this constantly in mind“. Monnet added a point which indicated that the Europeans lived in a period of transition. The Germans, he pointed out to Wilson, „still did not feel that they were treated as equals by the British. The improvement of relations between the two countries was more a matter of personalities and of language than of policies.“ Wilson assured his visitor „that it was the firm desire of the British Government to treat Germany as an equal.“²⁴ This was exactly what both Chancellor Kiesinger and his successor Brandt expected. It is most revealing that Brandt used the same expression in his memoirs. He wanted the Federal Republic to be „more equal“.²⁵

Ambassador Jackling in Bonn and Secretary of State Stewart in London agreed that fruitful collaboration with the Federal Republic was desirable as well as feasible. In Jackling's view there was a good opportunity for close Anglo-German relations as Britain had „relinquished the role of a super-power“ and was ready to concentrate her „attention on the same field as concerns the Federal Republic, namely Europe. The Germans now see us as a European power of roughly the same size as themselves, sharing the same general European aims, and with the same security interests.“ In addition to this „close relations with the Federal Republic“ seemed essential in order „to make certain so far as we can that her European and Eastern policies coincide with our own, and work to our own advantage.“²⁶

The prospects for a working British-German Partnership seemed bright when Brandt became Chancellor in Bonn. Stewart was sure that Britain could „rely on Brandt within reasonable limits to look out for our interests where these might be endangered by French selfishness.“ On the eve of Brandt's first visit to London as Federal Chancellor Stewart described the state of Anglo-German relations almost enthusiastically as being „excellent“. „There is virtually nothing of a strictly bilateral nature that needs to be discussed. [...] Our underlying purpose during the visit should be to reinforce the new – and in the best sense, relaxed – climate of confidence in the Anglo-German relationship. For the first time in history we have a German Government about whose attitude towards Britain there are no lurking doubts and to whose Chancellor we can talk pretty well without inhibitions.“²⁷

Brandt's stay in Britain turned out to be a great success.²⁸ He was asked to address both Houses of Parliament. In Oxford he was given an honorary doctorate by the University. The talks with Wilson „showed a total identity of views“.²⁹ Willy Brandt was a popular figure. His *Ostpolitik* „had made him one

of the Labour Party's heroes".³⁰ The change of government in London in June 1970 did not have any impact. The personal relationship between Brandt and Heath was uncomplicated and friendly.³¹ The FCO strongly advised the new Conservative Government to maintain the „present excellent Anglo-German relations“. „Germany is the strongest member of the E.E.C. and a key both to our entry and to East-West relations.“³²

III. The first phase of *Ostpolitik* 1967/68: the German wish for rapprochement and the Soviet blockage of change

Given the views and interests, which Great Britain and the Federal Republic had in common, it is not surprising that London supported *Ostpolitik*. Bonn's determination to normalize its relations with the Governments of Eastern Europe and the general wish for détente were welcomed emphatically. At the same time British observers warned of over optimism and wishful thinking. In August 1967 Ambassador Roberts pointed out that a „new chapter in relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe“ had opened. But he did not fail to notice the „inherent conflict between demands of Bonn's Eastern and reunification policies“. ³³ The Federal Republic could not have both the improvement of her relations with the East and the continual prevention of recognition of the GDR as a second German state. But exactly this was the aim of the Grand Coalition Government in Bonn and the FCO duly took note of it. The Federal Government expected the British to use their influence with Third World countries, and particularly Commonwealth countries, to prevent them from recognizing the GDR. The FCO was prepared to consider „whether we could, if requested, do something to help.“³⁴ Indeed, members of the Commonwealth were asked to adapt to the West German view.³⁵

Although the new *Ostpolitik* by not including the GDR stopped half-way and incurred „Soviet and East German hostility“³⁶, FCO officials realized that „we must continue to encourage the Germans to maintain this policy.“³⁷ Furthermore, the FCO was active in giving moral support to the Federal Republic in Eastern European capitals: „As time goes on, it is perhaps being borne in on the Germans that ‚sincere words said in private‘ by the British and others can do as much, if not more, to help them in Eastern Europe as the almost mystical influence which they tend to ascribe to General de Gaulle.“³⁸ On the whole, however, officials in the Western European Department and in the Eastern European and Soviet Department of the FCO did not overlook „that the Eastern Europeans had little room for manoeuvre“. The FCO did not share the „wishful optimism of the political leaders of the Grand Coalition“. ³⁹ Early in 1968 it became apparent that the *Ostpolitik* had met with only „limited success“, due to „the East German and Polish pressure on the Soviet Union and the other East European countries“ which had „produced a sharp stiffening of the

Communist ranks“.⁴⁰ Progress seemed only conceivable if some kind of recognition of the GDR was taken into consideration. In August 1968 no one could doubt that the policy of change through rapprochement had failed. Change seemed to occur in Czechoslovakia but the Soviet hegemonic power intervened brutally and destroyed any exaggerated hopes in the simultaneity of change and détente. There was only one way out. The search for détente had to be combined with the acceptance of the status quo. Otherwise the Soviet propaganda campaign against the Federal Republic would continue.

The sobering events in Czechoslovakia revealed both the crisis of the reform movement in the East and the limits of the West German approach to détente but also a crisis of trust in the relations of the Federal Republic with some of her major Allies. The French Government accused Bonn of having provoked the Soviet Union by irresponsibly encouraging the reform communists in Prague. Confronted with Soviet threats, the Federal Republic asked for psychological support and some sign of Western solidarity. In contrast to the French the British did not disappoint the Germans. Britain was the only country which recalled its Parliament for a debate on the Czechoslovakian crisis and Foreign Secretary Stewart defended the German position. Brandt appreciated this in a message to his British colleague but he asked for more. In a private conversation with Lance Pope, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Bonn, on 14 September 1968 he was extremely worried that the French refused a statement of solidarity with the Federal Republic. He said „that the East Europeans would attack the Federal Republic in every conceivable form except militarily. This would be bound to have its effect. Both he and the Chancellor were disappointed by the moral support given by the Allies. The Americans had failed to understand how urgently and basically Russian action in Czechoslovakia had affected and would continue to affect the population in the Federal Republic. [...] There was a feeling that the Federal Republic’s Allies were more or less leaving the Germans to fend for themselves.“ Brandt hoped „that some encouragement might be forthcoming from Britain. [...] The British Government must surely realize that the Russians were now about to make an all out drive against the Federal Government, to put fear into the population, to cast doubt, to drive a wedge between the Germans and their Western Allies.“⁴¹

Brandt’s „depressed outburst“⁴² to a diplomat who was well known to him personally was reported to London on the same day as Jackling saw Brandt and delivered the message that Britain emphasized „the importance of maintaining the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and promoting European unity as the essential response to Czech events“. On this official occasion Brandt was less critical of France and still hoped for a „Tripartite front“. „If however the French would not associate themselves, a U.S./U.K. statement would still be most valuable.“⁴³ The FCO was „much surprised and somewhat shocked“ by the view Brandt had uttered in private. Jackling’s explanation was that „the Germans

were having a fit of self-pitying nerves. [...] Adding this natural nervousness to Herr Brandt's own occasional and well known fits of gloom had no doubt produced some unguarded inmost thoughts which should however be recorded as a temporary and curable depression rather than the basis of his policy or that of the Government generally.“ As a consequence Permanent Under-Secretary Gore-Booth was convinced „that a policy of ‚hand-holding‘ was the right one for us at this time“. ⁴⁴ A few days later Prime Minister Wilson sent a letter to Chancellor Kiesinger in which he took the side of the Federal Republic and gladly observed that there was a „fundamental identity of views between our two Governments“. However great the abhorrence of the Soviet action, there was no alternative to the „policies of seeking peace, order and understanding in Europe through negotiation“. ⁴⁵ Two weeks later Brandt was told by Stewart in New York that the latter „had lost no opportunity of making clear, both publicly and in private conversation with the Russians, the folly of their policy of hostility towards the Federal Republic.“ Stewart added however that the Federal Republic should sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty „as soon as possible“. Whereas Moscow would lose a propaganda weapon, the signature would not affect Germany's „real security“. ⁴⁶

Summarizing the British reaction to *Ostpolitik* during its first phase in 1967 and 1968 it has to be said that the Federal Republic could count on Britain in every respect. Although the British were sceptical about an early success of *Ostpolitik* they encouraged the Germans in their new approach. When *Ostpolitik* stagnated and the Federal Republic became the target of fierce attacks from the East, Britain defended the German position wholeheartedly.

IV. The breakthrough of *Ostpolitik* 1969/70

This pattern did not change in 1969 and 1970 when, after the elections to the *Bundestag* and the forming of a SPD-FDP Government, *Ostpolitik* entered its second phase. The new Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 28 November 1969 and started negotiations on the renunciation of the use of force with the Soviet Union in December 1969, which led to the Treaty of Moscow in August 1970. The talks between Gromyko and Bahr in Moscow lasted several weeks and were the final proof of growing self-confidence and new assertiveness in West German politics. The Federal Government did not ask for permission and insisted on playing an independent role regardless of doubts and even some mistrust in Washington, Paris and London. According to his memoirs Brandt found reactions in London less nervous than elsewhere. ⁴⁷

In London, however, the FCO at times felt somewhat unhappy about the way in which it was informed, although Brandt stressed right from the beginning that it was in the German interest to coordinate the different levels of contacts and

negotiations (bilateral German-Soviet talks, Four Power negotiations on Berlin, bilateral American-Soviet SALT negotiations).⁴⁸ From the British point of view, which was shared by the Americans and the French, the problem was that the Federal Government informed the Three Powers but did not consult with them. Deputy Under-Secretary Thomas Brimelow was quite outspoken in his complaint: „The new German Chancellor tends to go ahead with his Eastern policy without consulting his Foreign Office, let alone his Allies. We are up against a real and urgent need for consultation and coordination.“⁴⁹ As a consequence of this frustration the British Embassy in Bonn was instructed to remind the German authorities of the implications of any unilateral acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line as the Western border of Poland, which the Federal Government might entertain.⁵⁰ Great Britain as a Power responsible for Germany as a whole insisted on being consulted in advance. Any disruption of the Potsdam settlement had to be avoided. Although the Federal Government did not want to run any risk and did not question the rights and obligations of the Four Powers, there was some uneasiness in London. The Germans might be tempted to ignore the rights of the Western Powers in Germany and above all in Berlin for the sake of some early progress in the German question. On the one hand Brandt stressed the need for the Three Powers and the Federal Republic to reach a common position on matters affecting Allied responsibility, particularly over Berlin. On the other hand it seemed clear that Bahr in his talks in Moscow said „a great deal“ about Berlin „without prior Four Power⁵¹ agreement on what he should say“. The West Germans were right in insisting on „close consultation“. But „consultation means consultation in advance and not post facto“.⁵²

The British Government was confronted with a new feature of West German foreign policy. Bonn wanted to take initiatives of its own. From the British point of view „more, better and earlier information from the Federal Government about the moves it intends to make“ would have been helpful.⁵³ But this did not mean that *Ostpolitik* in general was not regarded as most useful. Furthermore, the Government in Bonn seemed to be „prepared to think constructively“. „No harm has yet been done and the Germans obviously want to keep in step.“⁵⁴ Indeed the Federal Government made every effort to keep its Allies sufficiently informed. Brandt sent many letters to this end to the British Prime Minister as well as to the Presidents of the United States of America and of France. In addition to this endless bilateral and multilateral meetings took place on various levels. Foreign Minister Scheel met his colleagues frequently and a regular occasion for an exchange of views and information were the conferences of the so-called Bonn Group, which was composed of the Federal Germans and the representatives of the Three Powers.⁵⁵

The German information policy included the British press as well. A member of the Government, himself a former journalist, travelled to London in July 1970

and met journalists of the leading British papers in order to explain to them the motives and aims of *Ostpolitik*. He found out that his interlocutors agreed that détente was desirable and that *Ostpolitik* was a valuable contribution to it. But they had also probing questions as to the ‚real‘ goals of *Ostpolitik*.⁵⁶ So far comments in the British press had been friendly, although there were differences in the emphasis of support for *Ostpolitik* and in the degree of optimism as to the chances of détente.⁵⁷ The enthusiasm of the *New Statesman* was not shared entirely by the *Times* or the *Economist* which regarded an early change in the Soviet attitude less likely. But in spite of the danger that *Ostpolitik* might be more to the advantage of the Soviet Union than the West, all papers backed the general course of *Ostpolitik*.⁵⁸ A supportive attitude was also expressed by the British participants of the *Königswinter* Conferences, the yearly meetings of experts in Britain and the Federal Republic concerned with the Anglo-German relations.⁵⁹

Again and again the search for the underlying motives of *Ostpolitik* (as well as for the true aims of Soviet policies) occupied the minds of politicians, diplomats, journalists and foreign policy experts elsewhere. One risk was ruled out however. There was no evidence that Bonn wanted an accord with Moscow at the expense of its Allies. Trusting that the Federal Republic would stay loyally in the Western camp was an essential precondition for Britain’s continual support. The success of *Ostpolitik* would serve Western interests in general. Great Britain too wished to improve her relations with the Soviet Union which had been at a low ebb for various reasons. Michael Stewart did not want to run „the risk of being accused of rigidity and lack of enthusiasm for a détente between East and West“, and although he was not sure about Soviet intentions he argued that the West could not reject Soviet initiatives for a conference on European security „out of hand“. ⁶⁰ Public opinion and especially the younger generation in Western countries would not accept a pure Cold War attitude any longer.⁶¹ Therefore the West had to embark on a course „which would appear credible to public opinion in the NATO countries.“⁶²

Given this general interest in détente, an active role of the Federal Republic as a pacemaker in East-West relations was welcome. When *Ostpolitik* was under inter-allied discussion the FCO wanted to avoid „any division of the 4 Powers (US, UK, France and Germany)“. ⁶³ There seemed to be a danger in this regard, when rumours on American and French reservations about *Ostpolitik* spread.⁶⁴ At this juncture it was of the utmost importance that Jackling „almost emphatically“ endorsed *Ostpolitik* in the Bonn Group⁶⁵, and that Wilson gave a clear answer when asked by President Nixon in January 1970 „whether he regarded the new German Government as firmly committed to the Atlantic Alliance or whether he felt that this commitment might be gradually eroded by Herr Brandt’s new policy of promoting better relations with Eastern Europe.“ Wilson stated succinctly „that he had no doubts about Herr Brandt’s loyalty to

the Alliance. Nor did he feel anxious about his new *Ostpolitik*.⁶⁶ Until the end of his term as Prime Minister Wilson assured Brandt repeatedly of his „full support“ for the attempts „to come to terms with the Russians, the Poles and East Germans“.⁶⁷

When the Conservative Government took office in June 1970 the general attitude towards *Ostpolitik* remained unchanged. At that time Bahr's negotiations with Gromyko had produced the first concrete results. Due to a leak to a German paper they became known publicly. The *Times* wondered whether the Federal Republic's Allies were taken by surprise or whether they had been informed properly about the state of negotiations.⁶⁸ To many, Bahr appeared to be an „evil genius“ of secret diplomacy, who in his intimate talks with the Soviets in Moscow might have been tempted to go too far.⁶⁹ In this volatile situation an unequivocal voice of support for *Ostpolitik* was raised by the British Ambassador in Bonn. Jackling sent a long despatch to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the new Secretary of State. After having enumerated the priorities of British policy (security, prosperity, strength of NATO, entry into the European Communities), he concluded: „It is against this background that Her Majesty's Government have hitherto thought it wise to support the Federal Government's *Ostpolitik*, not only because we too favour the relaxation of tension, which is its main aim, but also because of our interest in developing as close bilateral relations as possible with the Federal Republic for a number of reasons, of which our negotiations for membership of the European Communities are prominent.“ Furthermore, Brandt's *Ostpolitik* deserved British approval because „beneficial effects on political and economic integration in Western Europe“ could be expected. Jackling was convinced that there was no danger of a West German drift towards the East. He believed in what Brandt stressed again and again, namely, „that the Federal Republic can only safely seek an opening to the East, if it keeps its feet firmly embedded in NATO and the European Communities.“⁷⁰ In fact, *Rapallo* was no option for the Federal Republic when her security depended on the West. After all, the wish for détente did not mean that the East-West conflict was over.⁷¹

In his perceptive analysis of *Ostpolitik* Jackling did not fail to mention an important aspect. The Governments in Moscow and Bonn entertained „very different hopes“. Whereas the Soviet Union's main goal was the „consolidation of existing frontiers“, the Federal Republic, while respecting the European borders, „will not regard such arrangements as constituting a fixed and permanent settlement of the German question“ or of the political status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. *Ostpolitik*, if successful, would stimulate the further process of détente which „could unloose powerful forces for change in Eastern Europe“. Arguing in this way Jackling emphasized the „dynamic element in Herr Brandt's policy“.⁷² A more cautious view tended to stress the Soviet wish „to manipulate the European scene“⁷³ and the negative impact of the „future

forward policies by the Russians“, in case *Ostpolitik* only acknowledged the status quo and the Brezhnev doctrine. The Soviets disliked Western European integration and hoped „to use talks on European security to sow doubts about it.“ Given their interest in a conference on security in Europe, it was not pointless to probe their willingness „to pay a price“.⁷⁴

When the German-Soviet Treaty was signed in Moscow on 12 August 1970 it was still uncertain whether the Soviet Government would be prepared to pay a price, for instance, in the form of a reasonable settlement on Berlin. The Soviet Union’s image was still overwhelmingly negative in Whitehall. From the FCO’s point of view „the potential Soviet threat to Western Europe“ appeared „complex“. The West had to reckon with the ongoing „Soviet probing for weak points in Western Europe“.⁷⁵ Douglas-Home did not rule out that *Ostpolitik* could eventually achieve positive results, but his perception of the Soviet Union was still shaped by mistrust and a Cold War outlook. It remained to be seen whether the Soviets really wanted a relaxation of tension⁷⁶ and „whether the long term advantages for which Herr Brandt hopes will ever be achieved“.⁷⁷ This did not mean that the German-Soviet accord and „its accompanying talk of détente“ was „in any sense unwelcome“. But a strong „need for precision in the definition of détente“ was felt in the FCO.⁷⁸ In this state of insecurity, when the consequences of the Treaty of Moscow could not yet be foreseen, optimists and sceptics alike could develop their views. The *New Statesman* regarded the treaty as a proof for the Soviet wish for détente. The *Economist* did not discover an immediate disadvantage for the West, but warned of any illusions as nothing had really changed for the better. The *Times*, as usual, stood in the middle and reported benevolently.⁷⁹

The *Economist* expressed the fear that *Ostpolitik* could be detrimental to NATO if it led to an eventual reorientation of the Federal Republic towards the East which, it felt, was a distinct possibility.⁸⁰ The FCO came to a much more realistic conclusion: „Given Herr Brandt’s insistence that his ‚*Ostpolitik*‘ is only a part of his general European policy, we ourselves doubt whether the Soviet Government entertain any hopes of detaching the Federal Government from the West in the short or medium term.“⁸¹ Otherwise the British Government, as mentioned above, could not have regarded the Federal Republic as a close ally. And yet, the ghost of *Rapallo* was not completely dead. Prime Minister Edward Heath told his Cabinet: „Close relationships between Germany and the Soviet Union had seldom been to our advantage in the past.“ Therefore every effort had to be made to ensure that the past remained buried and a relaxation in German-Soviet relations was compatible with the existing German obligations as a Western country. That is why Heath, in contrast to President Pompidou of France, welcomed Brandt’s suggestion to hold a Western summit shortly after the Treaty of Moscow had been signed. In Heath’s opinion „it was important to ensure – and to demonstrate publicly – that the Federal Government’s *Ostpolitik*

was not weakening Germany's links with the West or her commitment to the North Atlantic Alliance.⁸²

The Federal Government in Bonn needed no admonition. It not only kept its Allies informed and assured them of its loyalty, but declared also that the ratification of the German-Soviet Treaty depended on a satisfactory agreement of the Four Powers on Berlin. Would Bonn be able to maintain this position? Douglas-Home was not sure whether it could adhere to this package.⁸³ Prime Minister Heath, when meeting President Nixon in December 1970, suspected a „growing disposition“ in the Federal Republic „to overlook their original undertaking to make the ratification of the German-Soviet Treaty conditional on a settlement about Berlin. Were they perhaps going too far and too fast in their desire to normalize relations with the Soviet Government?“ In his answer Nixon expressed the fear that the „real purpose“ of the Soviet Union „remained the detachment of Germany from NATO“. For him „it was essential to tie Germany into Western Europe in both political and military terms“. Given the conflict between Soviet and Western interests in respect to the Federal Republic, „the *Ostpolitik* was a dangerous affair“ in American eyes. The U.S. Government „would do nothing to encourage it“.⁸⁴

At the same time it did not block it and even assured the Federal Government that rumours about American misgivings as to the speed of *Ostpolitik* were unfounded.⁸⁵ Washington was as interested in détente as the Federal Republic but wanted to be in control of the process. In particular Kissinger, having in mind his linkage strategy, did not like being pressed by the Federal Government to make extra efforts in the Four Power negotiations on Berlin. In Brandt's view the talks on Berlin, held by the Ambassadors of the Four Powers, were dragging on for too long a time. He suggested that they should be given a „conference like character“. Neither the Americans nor the British were happy about the German desire to accelerate the negotiations. Heath found it „disturbing how Herr Brandt threw out these ideas without any consultation“.⁸⁶

Pending the outcome of the Berlin talks the British Government maintained its somewhat cool attitude to the prospects of détente. A meeting of Douglas-Home with Gromyko in October did not give any cause for optimism.⁸⁷ Unlike Ambassador Duncan Wilson in Moscow, Douglas-Home insisted on developing „our relations with Western rather than Eastern Europe“.⁸⁸ He turned down Wilson's idea of a more active policy towards the Soviet Union, taking German *Ostpolitik* as an example. Clearly the Foreign Secretary had a more sceptical view of the Soviet Union than his Ambassador. But Douglas-Home was a realist too: „There is nothing we can give the Russians which is comparable in value to them to the French partial withdrawal from NATO and the West German acceptance of the European *status quo*. Nor is Britain a super-power like the USA. As regards our taking the lead in East/West relations, these relations at

present consist essentially of the German question. [...] And on German questions we cannot go faster than the Federal German Republic.“⁸⁹

Probably the British Foreign Secretary was not fully aware of how right he was. When the deliberations on Berlin reached their final stage the super-powers acted in concert with the Federal Republic. In order to reach an agreement the participation of Britain and France was indispensable. But the breakthrough was achieved in informal contacts and exchanges „behind the curtain of official talks“.⁹⁰ The participants were Henry Kissinger in the White House, Ambassadors Rush and Falin respectively of the American and Soviet Embassies in Bonn and Egon Bahr of the Federal Chancellery. German *Ostpolitik* and the U.S. policy of *détente* had become congruent strategies. Looking back Ambassador Jackling praised the close cooperation of all Governments involved in the negotiations on Berlin.⁹¹ One should not forget, however, that the British Government had been concerned since the beginnings of *Ostpolitik* that the Federal Government might overlook the implications of its policy for the status of Berlin⁹² or might even „embark on courses which would prejudice Western interests, in particular the maintenance of the quadripartite status of Berlin“.⁹³

Again, it was the perception of *Ostpolitik*, not *Ostpolitik* itself, that mattered. Although the Federal Republic acted in full loyalty to the Three Western Powers and to NATO in general, there was a subliminal fear that the Soviet Union, „playing on German anxieties“,⁹⁴ might succeed in her alleged goal of loosening German links with the West and dividing Western Europe. The satisfaction at the agreement on Berlin⁹⁵ went hand in hand with the request for consultation and policy coordination. When Brandt met Brezhnev for an informal summit in Oreanda on the Crimean Peninsula in September 1971, which came as a total surprise, the British, unlike the French, kept calm.⁹⁶ But after Brandt had sent his report of the talks to London,⁹⁷ Heath did not miss the opportunity to point out to him that the Soviet Union wanted to test the solidarity of the Western Alliance. The British Government remained in favour „of serious discussions with the East“, but was also „conscious of the pitfalls on the way“. Heath expressed his confidence, which could also be understood as a reminder, „that the Alliance can stand the strains of *détente* as it has survived the test of the Cold War. But in a climate of relaxation we shall have to be no less, and indeed more, on our guard.“⁹⁸

The meeting between Brandt and Brezhnev was the first of a series of East-West talks at summit level in 1971 and 1972. A little later Brezhnev saw the French Government in Paris, his first visit to a Western country. In May 1972, after the *Bundestag* had ratified the Treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, President Nixon went to Moscow and signed the SALT agreement. The Berlin agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers in June, and in

November 1972 preliminary talks started in Helsinki on the calling of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Given the positive results of the various talks and negotiations which had been conducted since 1969, Douglas-Home for a moment could forget the doubts which had haunted him. After having signed the Berlin agreement he appreciated Brandt's „efforts in improving East/West relations“. He remarked: „We are all in your debt.“⁹⁹

¹ Although the FCO was formed from the merger of the Foreign Office with the Commonwealth Office only in October 1968 the expression FCO will be used throughout for the period under consideration in this paper.

² See Hartmut Philippe's chapter in this book.

³ Roger Morgan, „Willy Brandt's ‚Neue Ostpolitik‘: British Perceptions and Positions, 1969-1975“, *An Anglo-German Dialogue. The Munich Lectures on the History of International Relations*, Ed. Adolf M. Birke et. al. (Munich: Saur, 2000), 181.

⁴ This article is mainly based on archival research. Unfortunately I was able to use the rich material of the Public Record Office only selectively so far. – I am most grateful to my friend Dr. David Williamson who saved me from many grammatical mistakes and linguistic faults.

⁵ Wolfgang Schmidt, *Kalter Krieg, Koexistenz und kleine Schritte. Willy Brandt und die Deutschlandpolitik 1948-1963* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001); Peter C. Speicher, „The Berlin Origins of Brandt's Ostpolitik, 1957-1966“, Dissertation, Cambridge University, 2000.

⁶ Franz Eibl, *Politik der Bewegung. Gerhard Schröder als Außenminister 1961-1966* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001).

⁷ Roberts in a despatch to London, 22 August 1967, FCO 33/103, PRO. See also Frank Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators. The Destruction and Revival of Europe 1930-70* (London, 1991), 246-259.

⁸ W.R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin. The Cold War Struggle over Germany* (Houndmills and London: Macmillan, 1999), 215.

⁹ Adrian W. Schertz, *Die Deutschlandpolitik Kennedys und Johnsons: Unterschiedliche Ansätze innerhalb der amerikanischen Regierung* (Cologne, 1992), 363.

¹⁰ Memorandum „Germany and Berlin“ by H.T. Morgan, Head of the Western European Department, 10 April 1968, FCO 33/104, PRO. See also minute by P.T. Hayman, Superintending Under-Secretary, Eastern European and Soviet Department, 26 March 1968, *ibid.*

¹¹ Memorandum by Bahr, *Ostpolitik nach der Besetzung der CSSR*, 1 October 1968, AAPD 1968, 1280.

¹² Brandt in a conversation with Wilson, 8 April 1974, Bahr Papers 1/EB AA 000441, AsD.

¹³ Keith Robbins, *Present and Past. British Images of Germany in the First Half of the Twentieth Century and their Historical Legacy* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1999).

¹⁴ On various aspects of this crisis in the institutions of military, political and financial power see Carole Fink et. al. (Eds.), *1968: The World Transformed* (Cambridge: University Press, 1998).

¹⁵ For the context of this constellation see Anne Deighton, „British-West German Relations, 1945-1972“, *Uneasy Allies. British-German Relations and European Integration since 1945*, Ed. Klaus Larres (Oxford: University Press, 2000), 27-44.

¹⁶ See the interesting comment by Brandt on Wilson's memoirs published in 1971. Brandt was surprised that Wilson dealt with international politics as if Britain were still a world-power. Willy Brandt, *Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960-1975* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976), 325.

¹⁷ Memorandum by Denis Greenhill, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, for Secretary of State Douglas-Home, June 1970 [no exact date], PREM 15/64. See also the memoirs of Greenhill's predecessor Paul Gore-Booth, *With Great Truth and Respect* (London, 1974), 424.

¹⁸ Greenhill, as quoted above note 17.

¹⁹ Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (London, 1993). On West German foreign policy and its European dimension see the recent synthesis Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung 1945-2000* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001).

²⁰ FCO memorandum, 15 May 1969, DBPO, 146.

²¹ Despatch to FCO (entitled „Towards a National Foreign Policy“), 9 April 1969, FCO 33/566, PRO.

²² Minute by Morgan, 9 May 1969, FCO 33/566, PRO.

²³ The Eastern European and Soviet Department too was concerned with „the increasingly preponderant position of West Germany in Europe and the decline of French influence“. Minute by C.S.R. Giffard, Head of the Department, 13 January 1969. Giffard commented on the Soviet „fears about Germany’s growing strength in Europe“. Hayman minuted the same day: „I think the Soviet Union is nervous about the enhanced status of Germany.“ PREM 13/2959, PRO.

²⁴ Record of a conversation between Wilson and Monnet, 29 January 1967, PREM 13/2632, PRO.

²⁵ Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1989), 189.

²⁶ Jackling, as quoted above note 21.

²⁷ Memorandum by Stewart for Prime Minister Wilson, 26 February 1970, PREM 13/3222, PRO.

²⁸ Brandt, *Begegnungen*, 324-325.

²⁹ Harold Wilson, *The Labour Government 1964-1970. A Personal Record* (London, 1971), 765. For records of the conversations, 2 and 3 March 1970, see AAPD 1970, 333-341 and 348-358.

³⁰ Denis Healey, *The Time of My Life* (London, 1989), 359. See also the favourable comments by George Brown, *In My Way* (London, 1971), 252-253 and James Callaghan, *Time and Chance* (London, 1987), 295-296.

³¹ Brandt, *Begegnungen*, 326. Heath shared these feelings. After talks with Brandt in Bonn he wrote to him, 8 April 1971: „The degree of understanding between our countries is now such that, as you remarked, there were really no bilateral matters which called for discussion between us. On the other hand, with regard to the wider issues of European unity and relations with the East, and indeed the whole future of Western Europe, we have interests and concerns in common of the most profound significance for us both. To be able to talk to you in complete frankness about these matters was of immense value to me.“ Bundeskanzler 52, WBA. See also the portrait of Brandt by Edward Heath, *The Course of My Life* (London, 1998), 605-606.

³² Memorandum by Greenhill, quoted above note 17.

³³ Despatch by Roberts, 22 August 1967, FCO 33/103, PRO.

³⁴ Gore-Booth in a conversation with Ambassador Blankenhorn, 9 January 1967, FCO 33/102, PRO. For the British attitude towards the GDR Henning Hoff, „Großbritannien und die DDR 1955-1973“, Dissertation, University of Cologne, 2001. A publication is forthcoming.

³⁵ Klaus Larres, „Britain and the GDR. The Politics of Trade and Recognition by Stealth“, *Britain and Germany in Europe, 1949-1990*, Ed. J. Noakes et al. (Oxford: University Press, 2002), 213-215.

³⁶ FCO to certain missions, 3 May 1968, FCO 33/104, PRO.

³⁷ Minute by Lord Hood, Superintending Under-Secretary Western European Department, 12 September 1967, FCO 33/103, PRO.

³⁸ Minute by Morgan, 22 December 1967, FCO 33/104, PRO.

³⁹ Ibid. See also the Minutes by Hood, 23 December 1967, and Hayman, 26 March 1968, *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Memorandum on „Germany and Berlin“ by Morgan, 10 April 1968, FCO 33/104, PRO.

⁴¹ British Embassy to FCO, 16 September 1968, FCO 33/573, PRO.

⁴² Minute by Gore-Booth („Views of Herr Willy Brandt“), 19 September 1968, *ibid.*

⁴³ Jackling to FCO, 16 September 1968, *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Minute by Gore-Booth, quoted above note 42. See also Jackling to Gore-Booth, 16 October 1968, after he had the chance to talk to Lance Pope who had been on leave. Jackling quoted from a minute by Pope to him: „Brandt was certainly referring [...] to a feeling which existed in government and political circles here at that time. It was not so much that Britain or H.M.G. had put a foot wrong, but that in view of American reticence and French behaviour this was a very favourable opportunity for H.M.G. to do something special. Brandt’s message really was this, but when he talks to me on a sort of old boy net he rather naturally does not bother to use particularly diplomatic language.“ In the following paragraph of his letter Jackling reported about the threat perception in the Federal Republic: „The background of all this is the extent to which there is a feeling in Germany that conditions have starkly changed for the worse as far as their own security is concerned. I was impressed by the strength of this feeling in my visit to Baden-Württemberg last week. There was and still is an anxiety and indeed fear which is deep-rooted and which will last for a long time. Objective analysis, and it is perhaps a little easier to be objective than the Germans – a third of whose country is in effect under Russian occupation – suggests that these feelings are much exaggerated. Nevertheless, there is in Germany a widespread feeling that a major and horrible event has taken place which weakens not only Germany but the whole Western world.“ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Wilson to Kiesinger, 26 September 1968, PREM 13/2673, PRO. See also AAPD 1968, 1197.

⁴⁶ Conversation between Brandt and Stewart, 10 October 1968. FCO 33/573, PRO. See also AAPD 1968, 1323. As to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Stewart saw an „inconsistency between the German reluctance to sign the Treaty and their professed desire for a more active policy on good relations with the East.“ Stewart in conversation with Wilson, 10 February 1969, PREM 13/2674, PRO.

⁴⁷ Brandt, *Erinnerungen*, 189.

⁴⁸ Conversation between Brandt and Jackling, 30 October 1969, Bahr Papers 1/EB AA 000441, AsD. See also the information by Ambassador Blankenhorn for the FCO, 31 October 1969, AAPD 1969, 1201 and a meeting of Foreign Minister Scheel with his American, British and French colleagues in Brussels on the eve of the NATO ministerial meeting, 3 December 1969, AAPD 1969, 1359-1361.

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- ⁴⁹ Minute by Brimelow, 19 November 1969, FCO 33/476, PRO.
- ⁵⁰ Demarche by Counsellor Hanbury-Tenison, 21 November 1969, AAPD 1969, 1328.
- ⁵¹ Namely the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic.
- ⁵² Minute by J.K. Drinkall (Western European Department), 2 March 1970, about a letter by Brandt to Wilson of 26 February 1970, PREM 13/3221, PRO.
- ⁵³ Record of a conference of FCO officials and British Ambassadors in Eastern European countries, 8 May 1970, DBPO, 233.
- ⁵⁴ Minute by Drinkall, quoted above note 52.
- ⁵⁵ See the numerous meetings of the Bonn Group documented in AAPD 1970, *passim*.
- ⁵⁶ Letter by Karl Moersch, *Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär* in the *Auswärtiges Amt* 1970-1974, to the author, 17 December 2001.
- ⁵⁷ For this I draw on Timo Schiefer, „Großbritannien und die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1969-1973“, Magisterarbeit, University of Mannheim, 1999.
- ⁵⁸ *New Statesman*, 24 October 1969, 6 March 1970; *Times*, 22 October 1969, 29 October 1969, 17 November 1969; *Economist*, 3 January 1970, 10 January 1970.
- ⁵⁹ It is interesting that in 1972, when the *Bundestag* had to decide on the ratification of the Treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, the British speakers appealed to the CDU/CSU opposition to give their consent. See the Reports published by the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft*: Königswinter Conference, Trinity College Cambridge, 9-13 April 1970, 25-26; XXI. Deutsch-englisches Gespräch, Königswinter, 26.-28. März 1971, 21; XXII. Deutsch-englisches Gespräch, Königswinter, 17.-19. März 1972, 12. See also Morgan, „Willy Brandt's ‚Neue Ostpolitik‘“, 180-181. Morgan attended the conferences.
- ⁶⁰ Stewart in Cabinet, 11 December 1969, DBPO, 198-199.
- ⁶¹ Stewart during a meeting with his American, French and German colleagues, 3 December 1969, AAPD 1969, 1363-1364; Stewart in a conversation with Brandt, 14 November 1969, *ibid.*, 1286. See also Michael Stewart, *Life and Labour. An Autobiography* (London, 1980), 220, 227-228.
- ⁶² Stewart in a conversation with his French colleague Schumann, 23 January 1970, PREM 13/3208, PRO.
- ⁶³ Minutes by Brimelow and Greenhill, 12 November 1969, FCO 33/571, PRO.
- ⁶⁴ On American and French attitudes towards Ostpolitik see the articles by Gottfried Niedhart, „The Federal Republic's Ostpolitik and the United States“, *The United States and the European Alliance since 1945*, Eds. Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1999), 289-311; „Partnerschaft und Konkurrenz: Deutsche und französische Ostpolitik in der Ära Brandt und Pompidou“, *Deutschland – Frankreich – Rußland. Begegnungen und Konfrontationen*, Eds. Ilja Mieck und Pierre Guillen (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2000), 345-371.
- ⁶⁵ Meeting on 22 January 1970, AAPD 1970, 67. For an assessment of the implications of West German foreign policy see also Embassy Bonn to FCO, 21 February 1970, PREM 13/3222, PRO.
- ⁶⁶ Conversation between Wilson and Nixon in Washington, 27 January 1970, FCO 7/1823, PRO. See also the brief by the FCO for Wilson, 7 January 1970: „H.M.G. [...] have repeatedly stated [...] that they wholeheartedly support German policies.“ The Prime Minister should „confirm our general support for Herr Brandt's policies and emphasize the need for close and continuing tripartite and quadripartite coordination in setting a course through the uncharted waters ahead and their possible hazards.“ FCO 7/1819, PRO.
- ⁶⁷ Wilson to Brandt, 24 April 1970, PREM 13/3219, PRO. See also Wilson to Brandt, 26 March 1970, Bundeskanzler 52, WBA.
- ⁶⁸ *Times*, 2 June 1970. See also *Times*, 24 July 1970.
- ⁶⁹ Schiefer, „Großbritannien und die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“, 78-79. Schiefer interviewed former British diplomats.
- ⁷⁰ Despatch by Jackling to Douglas-Home, 25 June 1970, FCO 28/916, PRO.
- ⁷¹ See also Klaus Larres, „Germany and the West: the ‚Rapallo Factor‘ in German Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s“, *The Federal Republic of Germany since 1949. Politics, Society and Economy before and after Unification*, Eds. Klaus Larres and Panikos Panay (London and New York, 1996), 301-318.
- ⁷² Jackling's despatch, quoted above note 70. On the „dynamic element“ of Ostpolitik see also Gottfried Niedhart, „Revisionistische Elemente und die Initiierung friedlichen Wandels in der neuen Ostpolitik 1967-1974“, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (2002), 233-266.
- ⁷³ Minute by Douglas-Home, 15 July 1970, DBPO, 246.
- ⁷⁴ Minute by C.L.G. Mallaby (Eastern European and Soviet Department) on „Soviet Policy in Europe“, 9 July 1970, FCO 28/916, PRO. See also DBPO, 246, note 9.
- ⁷⁵ Brimelow to Embassy Moscow, 14 August 1970, DBPO, 256.
- ⁷⁶ Douglas-Home in Cabinet, 3 September 1970, CAB 128/47, PRO; Douglas-Home in a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Rogers, 23 September 1970, FCO 7/1836, PRO. See also Lord Home, *The Way the Wind Blows. An Autobiography* (London, 1976), 250: „...all Communists are dedicated to a single end – victory over every other creed and every other way of life.“
- ⁷⁷ Brimelow, 14 August 1970, DBPO, 253.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 257.

⁷⁹ *New Statesman*, 14 August 1970; *Economist*, 15 August 1970; *Times*, 12 and 13 August 1970.

⁸⁰ *Economist*, 29 August 1970.

⁸¹ Brimelow, 14 August 1970, DBPO, 256.

⁸² Cabinet, 3 September 1970, CAB 128/47, PRO.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Conversation between Nixon and Heath in Washington, 17 December 1970, FCO 7/1842, PRO.

⁸⁵ Kissinger in a conversation with Horst Ehmke, Head of the Chancellery (*Chef des Bundeskanzleramts*), 21 December 1970. Ehmke had asked for the meeting. There was considerable anxiety in Bonn that the Western Allies might be critical towards *Ostpolitik* and not as determined as the Federal Government wished them to be in the Four Power talks on Berlin. See Niedhart, „The Federal Republic’s *Ostpolitik* and the United States: Initiatives and Constraints“, 299-300. Apparently Bonn sought reassurances of British support in this matter. FCO 7/1837, PRO.

⁸⁶ Heath in conversation with Rogers, 17 December 1970, FCO 7/1842, PRO. See also conversation with Nixon, above note 84. Heath referred to a letter by Brandt, 15 December 1970, AAPD 1970, 2273-2274.

⁸⁷ Records of two conversations, 27 October 1970, DBPO, 268-279.

⁸⁸ Douglas-Home to Wilson, 1 December 1970, DBPO, 290. See also Wilson to Douglas-Home, 8 February 1971, *ibid.*, 298-310.

⁸⁹ Douglas-Home to Wilson, 6 April 1971, DBPO, 310.

⁹⁰ Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, 247.

⁹¹ On the occasion of a dinner given by Foreign Minister Scheel on 26 August 1971 for the Ambassadors of the Three Powers and members of the *Bundestag*. Record of the meeting by Karl Wienand, 9 September 1971, Bahr Papers 1/EB AA 000461, AsD.

⁹² Stewart in his conversation with Brandt, 14 November 1969, AAPD 1969, 1283. See also a meeting of British and German officials, 21 November 1969, *ibid.* 1322-1323. For a fuller account see Morgan, „Willy Brandt’s ‚Neue Ostpolitik‘“, 184, 189, 195-197. See also Werner Link, „Deutsche Ostpolitik und die Zuständigkeit der Alliierten“, *Großbritannien und Ostdeutschland seit 1918*, Eds. Adolf M. Birke and Günther Heydemann (Munich: Saur, 1992), 107-120.

⁹³ Douglas-Home in Cabinet, 16 July 1970, CAB 128/47, PRO.

⁹⁴ Douglas-Home in conversation with Rogers, 3 October 1970, FCO 7/1814, PRO.

⁹⁵ Heath praised Brandt’s „courage, humanity and imagination“. Heath to Brandt, 9 September 1971, Bundeskanzler 52, WBA. Heath did not mention that he did not accept the view that the Berlin agreement was „a fair deal“. Minute by Heath to Douglas-Home, 1 September 1971, DBPO, 377.

⁹⁶ *Times*, 17 September 1971; *Economist*, 18 September 1971. In his letter to Brandt quoted above in note 95 Heath commented that the visit „comes at an interesting time, and I look forward to hearing about your discussions with the Soviet leaders.“

⁹⁷ Identical letters by Brandt to Heath, Nixon and Pompidou, 19 September 1971, Bahr Papers 1/EB AH 00344B, AsD.

⁹⁸ Heath to Brandt, 27 September 1971. Heath continued: „The need to consult and to concert Western policies will increase, not at least over Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which in our view raises particularly difficult problems. The negotiations leading to the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, by intensifying the already very close consultative arrangements between the four Western Governments involved, have provided a useful basis for wider NATO coordination.“ Bundeskanzler 52, WBA.

⁹⁹ Douglas-Home to Brandt, 6 June 1972, *ibid.*